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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL ARE PROPERLY
FOUNDED ON PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT, AS
REFLECTED IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL.

Respondents1 contention that appellant's arguments on appeal
are not supported by the record of proceedings in the lower court,
Argumentf Point I, Respondents' Br.,5-7, is without merit.
On September 30, 1987, Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall heard and
granted Appellant's Motion To Supplement The Record On Appeal.
Pursuant to his Order, Appellant's Exhibit 1, attached, appellant
supplemented the Record On Appeal, hereinafter "ROA", with a
transcript of various proceedings in the lower court, in order to
fully amplify the basis for appellant's arguments in this appeal.
ROA, 667-816.
Appellant's contention that the trial court abused its
discretion by deciding and instructing the jury that under the
former Utah Comparative Negligence Act, Section 78-27-37,

U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, 1973; repealed, Section 78-27-38, U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, 1986, the negligence of appellant's decedent,
Darin Kelson, should be compared to the negligence of respondents,
to bar or reduce appellant's

recovery, Argument f Point I,

Appellant's Op. Br., 7-23, is fully supported by the record on
appeal showing the arguments of counsel and the rulings of the
lower court concerning this issue, including the statements of
appellant's counsel concerning appellant's intention to appeal the

1

lower court's ruling on this issue. ROA, 362, 550, 749-779; 784808.
Similarly, appellant's contention that the trial court erred
in ruling that the siblings of appellant's decedent could not
recover damages under Utah's Wrongful Death Statute, Section 7811-7, U.C.A. (1953), Argument. Point II, Appellant's Op. Br., 2326, is premised on the lower court's decision and ruling on this
issue, as reflected by the record. ROA,

677, 685-695, 732 and

737-739.
Finally, appellant's contention that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying appellant's motion for relief from, and
suppression of, a certain stipulation relating to the alleged
blood alcohol content of appellant's decedent, Darin Kelson, where
appellant's former counsel, Robert B. Hansen, entered into the
stipulation without the knowledge or consent of appellant, and
contrary

to

appellant's

expressed

desires

regarding

the

prosecution of this action, Argument, Point III, Appellant's Op.
Br., 27-29, is predicated on the lower court's denial of the
motion, as demonstrated in the record. ROA, 714-726, 733-34, and
739-41.

2

POINT II.

RESPONDENTS1 ARGUMENT THAT THE 1973 UTAH
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT APPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE PERMITS THE NEGLIGENCE OF
APPELLANT'S DECEDENT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO
APPELLANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING THE
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY APPELLANT, WHO WAS
NOT NEGLIGENT, IGNORES THE PLAIN TERMS OF
THE STATUTE AND WELL-ESTABLISHED RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Contrary to Respondents1 suggestion, Respondents1 Br., 8,
appellant does not contend that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence regarding the negligence of
appellant's decedent. ROA,

778-79, 794-95.

Appellant's contention is simply that where, as here, the
respondent's negligence was found to be a proximate cause of the
death of appellant's decedent, and the appellant seeking recovery
for the death of his decedent, was not negligent at all, the 1973
Utah Comparative Negligence Act applicable to this case does not
bar appellant's recovery against respondents, or permit the
reduction

of the

damages

recoverable

by

appellant

by

the

percentage of negligence attributable to the appellant's decedent.
In order to avoid the plain effect and construction of the
statute in question, respondents first attempt to engage in
impermissible legislative mind-reading, concluding that the 1973
Utah Comparative Negligence Act cannot mean exactly what it says,
merely because the statute represents a departure from prior law.
Respondents' Br., 8-9.
When

the

applicable

version

of

the

Utah

Comparative

Negligence Act was adopted in 1973, Utah's Wrongful Death Statute
had been on the books for approximately 60 years. Thus, it is only
3

reasonable to assume that the Utah Legislature considered the
Wrongful Death Statute and the cases decided under its provisions,
when the Legislature provided

in the 1973 Utah Comparative

Negligence Act, that "Any damages
proportion

to the

allowed

amount of negligence

shall

be diminished

attributable

to the

in
person

recovering."
A commonly accepted canon of statutory construction is that a
statute

should be interpreted

in accordance with its plain

meaning. The application of this principle to the 1973 Utah
Comparative Negligence Act supports appellant's contention that
the statute represented a departure from prior law by the State
Legislature.
Respondents

adopt

the

argument

of

appellant

in their

discussion of Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. 186 P.2d
293

(Utah, 1947), on rehearing.

189 P.2d

701

(Utah, 1948),

Respondents1 Br., 9-10.
It is precisely appellant's point that, prior to the 1973
Utah

Comparative

Negligence Act, a decedent's

contributory

negligence rendered his death not wrongful, thus barring any
right of recovery on behalf of his heirs under the Wrongful Death
Statute, but that the Legislature's adoption of Utah Comparative
Negligence Act in 1973, changed the law in this regard, by
providing that the contributory negligence of a decedent would not
bar his heir's recovery in a wrongful death action against a third
party, and that his heir's recovery would not be reduced by the
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decedent's negligence, such that the Van Wagoner case, and other
decisions predating the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act, are
irrelevant to the case at bar.
Respondent's reliance on Jensen v. Intermountain Health Carer
Inc. . 679 P.2d 903 (Utah 1984), Respondents' Br., 10, is also
misplaced since the statute before the Court in that case is
different than the statute

at issue in the case at bar. However,

this Court's rationale for the construction of the statute at
issue in Jensen is consonant with appellant's interpretation of
the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act
The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of
the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain
language of the Act.
679 P.2d at 906.
In the instant case, the plain language of the 1973 Utah
Comparative Negligence Act, requires that appellant, who was zero
percent negligent, should not be barred from recovering against a
third party whose negligence was a proximate

cause of his

decedent's death, or have his damages reduced, by the percentage
of negligence attributable to his decedent.
Respondents

also miss

the point

of Mayo

v.

Tri-Bell

Industries, Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986), which is
that, under the Texas law applicable there, a cause of action for
loss of consortium was "derivative".
Respondents completely mischaracterize Hull v. Silver, 577
P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), and appellant's reliance on it. Respondents'
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Br.,

12-15. Appellant

cites

Hull

solely

for

its holding,

acknowledged by respondents, that a wrongful death action is not a
"derivative" action in the State of Utah.
Hull did not consider the issue presently before this Court.
However, its holding, denying the applicability of a then existing
defense, Justice Hall's dissent notwithstanding,

577 P.2d at 10 6-

107, supports appellant's position here.
Moreover, as argued in appellant's opening brief, the reason
the recovery of heirs was barred prior to 1973 if the decedent was
contributorily negligent, was because under the then existing law,
the decedent's negligence rendered his death "not wrongful."

In

effect, contributory negligence on the part of the decedent took
the case outside the application of the Wrongful Death Statute.
Respondents take the concise, unambiguous language of Hull:
"The action is not derivative", and torture it into implying that
"a wrongful death action is essentially non-derivative, but
subject to certain defenses which are derivative." Respondents'
Br., 14. Appellant prefers to believe that the decisions of this
Court mean what they say.
Respondents' argument that the fact that a minority of states
have permitted actions for the loss of consortium by a person for
injury

to

a spouse by

a third party, notwithstanding

the

negligence of the spouse, does not mean that appellant can recover
under the facts of this case, because Utah has not recognized an
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action

to recover such damages, Respondents1 Br., Argumentr Point

11(C), 15-20, is similarly incorrect and misleading.
Appellant recognizes that Utah has not yet recognized an
action for loss of consortium for an injury to a spouse, but so
what?

This is a wrongful death case, and the right to recover for

loss of consortium in wrongful death cases, has existed for more
than 60 years.
Respondents' argument that the construction of the 1973 Utah
Comparative Negligence Act urged by appellant, produces an
"unfair" result, Respondents1 Br., 11, is simply, the subjective
view of respondents.
In adopting the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act,
Legislature spoke in clear and unambiguous terms. The statute is
'entitled to a presumption of validity and fairness.

If some

unfairness is perceived by respondents, they are certainly at
liberty to point them out.

However, having enacted the measure,

it should be up to the Legislature to change the statute, if it
sees fit.
Points

III & IV of Respondents' Argument r

require no

response. Appellant's position on the right of the decedent's
siblings to recover damages, and the blood alcohol stipulation
issues, are fully elucidated in appellant's opening brief, and
further supported by the additional citations to the Record On
Appeal referred to at the beginning of this brief.
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Appellant would like to alert the Court to the recent
decision of Sheahan v. Northeast

Illinois Regional Commuter

Railroad Corporation, 496 N.E. 2d 1179 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1986),
supporting appellant's contention that the siblings of appellant's
decedent are not precluded from recovering damages for his death
from a negligent third party in a wrongful death action, even
though they are not defined as the decedent's heirs in the Utah
Probate Code.
POINT III.

ADDITIONAL UTAH AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF
APPELLANT'S POSITION ON THE COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ISSUE.

In Phillips v. Tooele City Corporation, 28 Utah 2d 223, 500
P.2d 669 (1972), plaintiffs sued to recover damages to their
automobile after it collided with a city garbage truck.

At the

time of the collision, the car had been operated by plaintiffs' 16
year old daughter for whose negligence plaintiffs were responsible
pursuant to Section 41-2-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.
The trial court determined that the plaintiff's daughter had
been negligent as a matter of law in causing the collision.

The

court thereafter imputed the daughter's negligence to plaintiffs,
since her mother had signed for the license.
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed that the
daughter had been contributorily negligent. Since
this action was pre-1973, the daughter's personal
claims were completely barred by her contributory
negligence. With respect to the parents cause of
action for damage to their vehicle, however, this
Court held that the statutes in question were
"designed solely to protect innocent third parties
from the negligence of a minor driver by providing
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f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; t h e r e are no p r o v i s i o n s
t h e r e i n t h a t may be reasonably construed t o deny an
owner t h e r i g h t t o recover for a wrong done t o
him." (Emphasis supplied)
In so holding, t h i s Court reasoned t h a t
[T]his l e g i s l a t i v e policy t o broaden l i a b i l i t y for
t h e p r o t e c t i o n of an i n j u r e d p l a i n t i f f gives no
support t o t h e d o c t r i n e of imputed c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e which narrows t h e l i a b i l i t y of a
negligent defendant t o a p l a i n t i f f , who i s innocent
of actual negligence.
I d . at 673.
Consequently, this Court remanded the case for a new trial to
determine the negligence of defendant, if any, and the damages
sustained by the plaintiffs. This result obtained even though the
daughter

had no recourse,

statutorily

financially

and the plaintiff

responsible

parents

for their

were

daughter's

negligence..
Subsequently, in Otto v. Leany. 635 P.2d 410 (Utah 1981),
this Court considered a similar case.

There, however, the case

was tried under the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act at issue
here.

The jury found that the Leanyfs minor daughter was 65%

negligent,

the plaintiff Otto 35% negligent, and the parents 0%

negligent.

The jury awarded Otto 65% of his damages, and the

parents the full $900 in damages to their automobile.
appealed.

Otto

The Supreme Court sustained the award to the parents,

stating
The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the Phillips
[supra.] case as it was decided prior to
comparative negligence. As such, he argues, when
the Phillips case was decided the Court had no way
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of assessing the degree of negligence which could
be imputed. However, under comparative negligence,
the Court is provided with a clear and concise
method of assessing the imputed negligence.
The problem with the plaintiff's argument is that
he is comparing the wrong persons. The comparison
between plaintiff and Cynthia is 35% plaintiff, 65%
Cynthia. However, the comparison between plaintiff
and Reed and Mary Leany is plaintiff 100%, and Reed
and Mary 0%.
IdL at 411.
Appellant recognizes that this Court found support for its
decision in bailment law.

However, in both Phillips and Otto, the

parents had statutory responsibility for the conduct of their
daughters, and knowingly allowed the use of their automobile.
Nevertheless, this Court, as it has always done absent a statutory
mandate, refused to impute liability to non-negligent parties. The
same policy should be followed in the case at bar.
Respondents take the position that the negligence of Darin
Kelson should be imputed to his non-negligent parents. Here,
however, appellant seeks damages personal to him of far greater
import than a dented fender.

The damages have been authorized by

statute for more than 60 years, and enjoy unique constitutional
protection. Pre-comparative negligence cases denied recovery to
the heirs only because contributory negligence on the part of the
deceased rendered the death not wrongful, and took it outside the
statutory and constitutional context.
Under the 1973 Utah Comparative Negligence Act, there can be
a wrongful death even where the plaintiff's decedent is negligent.
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The Legislature has expressly stated that the only negligence to
be

compared

recovering.

with

the tortfeasor's

is that

"of the person

States with comparative negligence laws similar to

Utah, unanimously hold that actions by family members for loss of
consortium [which this is], are not affected by the negligence of
the injured or deceased party.
CONCLUSION
The law, equity, and principles of fundamental fairness
dictate that appellant recover the damages caused by respondents
in this case.

Since the jury found causative fault on the part of

respondents, appellant respectfully submits that this Court should
remand this action to the trial Court solely for a determination
of damages.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the judgment
"No Cause of Action" entered against appellant below, be reversed,
and the case remanded to a new jury for a determination of
damages.
Dated this JAf4* day of Mlt/mtfary^ , 1987.

COLLARD>& RUSSB3ZL

STEVE RUSSELL
KATHRYN COLLARD
Attorneys for Appellant
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Upon hearing of appellant's motion to supplement the record
with specifically designated portions of the record it is hereby
ordered that the same be granted and 30 days be allowed for the
reporter to complete the transcripts
After the transcripts are
filed appellant shall haue 10 days to file a reply brief; the
respondent shall haue 20 days thereafter to make any modifications
to its responsiue brief as deemed necessary.
This order is conditional upon appellant assuming the
reasonable cost incurred by respondent in modifying its brief.
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